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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Jockumsen has challenged on appeal the district court's improper reliance 
on information obtained during the course of competency evaluations of the defendant 
at sentencing, and improper inclusion of information from his competency evaluations in 
the presentence investigation report materials. In addition, Mr. Jockumsen has 
challenged the district court's failure to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to 
I.C.R. 32 and I.C. 19-2522 for purpose of sentencing. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address some of the State's contentions on 
appeal. While the State has argued that Mr. Jockumsen's assertion of a violation of his 
constitutional right against self-incrimination was waived because this issue was not 
raised before the district court, it is well-established that a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination is a fundamental error that can be raised for 
the first time on appeal. In addition, Mr. Jockumsen's claims regarding the district 
court's improper use of the competency evaluation materials at sentencing are 
justiciable for the first time on appeal as an abuse of the court's discretion because the 
district court's actions were in contravention of clearly applicable legal standards. 
These legal standards at sentencing include the statutory grant of immunity provided in 
I.C. § 18-215. 
This brief is also necessary to address the State's interpretation of the provisions 
of I.C. 3 18-215. In particular, this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that the scope of 
this statute extends to any of the statements made by the defendant in the course of 
producing the evaluation itself, not just to statements made for the purpose of treatment. 
Also, the State misinterprets the meaning of the term, "impeachment," as that phrase is 
used in the statute. 
Finally, this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that pertinent case law has 
previously considered, and rejected, the State's suggestion that the manifest disregard 
standard, as applied to the failure to sua sponfe order a mental health evaluation, is 
limited to a consideration of I.C.R. 32 to the exclusion of the statutory mandates 
contained in I.C. § 19-2522. To the contrary, this Court has repeatedly held that the 
provisions of I.C. § 19-2522 provide the legal standards governing the court's decision 
whether to order a psychological evaluation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Jockumsen's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this 
Reply Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
ISSUES 
1. Are Mr. Jockumsen's claims regarding the improper use of his competency 
evaluations at sentencing justiciable on appeal? 
2. Was the district court's use of Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluation at 
sentencing, and inclusion of this report in the Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), improper under I.C. 3 18-215? 
3. Does the proper standard for review of whether the district court was required to 
sua sponfe order a mental hearth evaluation for purposes of sentencing 
incorporate the requirements of both I.C.R. 32(d) and I.C. § 19-2522? 
ARGUMENT 
I, 
Mr. Jockumsen's Claims Regardina The Improper Use Of His Competencv Evaluations 
At Sentencina Are Properly Justiciable On Appeal 
A. Mr. Jockumsen's Assertion That The District Court's Use Of His Competency 
Evaluations At Sentencing Violated His Fifth Amendment Riaht Aaainst Seif- 
Incrimination Is Properly Justiciable Bv This Court As A Fundamental Error 
The State asserts in its Respondent's Brief that Mr. Jockurnsen's claim of a 
violation of his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination was waived 
because he failed to object to the district court's use of his competency evaluation 
against Mr. Jockumsen at sentencing. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) While defense 
counsel appears not to have raised any objection to the district court's admission and 
consideration of these materials, in both the PSI and as evidence in making its 
sentencing determination, this assertion of error may be properly reviewed by this Court 
as it constitutes a fundamental error that can be raised for the first time on appeal.' 
Both the ldaho Supreme Court and the ldaho Court of Appeals have held that 
violations of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination constitutes 
a fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. 
Whife, 97 ldaho 708, 714 n.8, 551 P.2d 1344, 1350 (1976); State v. Timmons, 145 
ldaho 279, 178 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2007); Stafe v. Kerchusky, 138 ldaho 671, 678, 67 
The State correctly notes in its Respondent's Brief that the issue of fundamental error 
was not raised in the initial Appellant's Brief. However, pursuant to l.A.R.35(c), a reply 
brief, "may contain additional argument in rebuttal to the contentions of the respondent." 
I.A.R. 35(c). Because the justiciability of the Fifth Amendment issue was raised by the 
State in its Respondent's Brief, Mr. Jockumsen may properly rebut the State's 
contention in this Reply Brief. 
P.3d 1283, 1290 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Poland, 116 ldaho 34, 36, 773 P.2d 651, 653 
(Ct. App. 1989). In addition, while the State attempts to cast the failure of defense 
counsel to object as a strategic decision, the Court in White makes clear that the 
"inference of strategic by-passing of constitutional objections occurs only when there is 
strong indication that counsel knew of the potential objection and chose to ignore it." 
White, 97 ldaho at 714 n.8, 551 P.2d at 1350. Here, there is no clear record that 
defense counsel knew of the Fifth Amendment violation incurred by the district court's 
use of Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluations at sentencing and by the inclusion of 
this material in his PSI. 
B. Mr. Jockumsen Did Not Waive His Riqht To Assert His Fifth Amendment Riuhts 
Durinu The Course Of His Competency Evaluations Because Mr. Jockumsen Did 
Not Have The Riqht To Invoke His Fifth Amendment Riuhts At That Stage Of The 
Proceedinqs 
The State asserts that Mr. Jockumsen waived his right to assert his Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination by participating in the competency 
evaluation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-12.) However, the State's argument is unavailing 
because, at the time he participated in the competency proceedings, Mr. Jockumsen 
was operating under a grant of statutory use immunity for his statements pursuant to 
I.C. § 18-215, and therefore he could not have invoked his Fifth Amendment rights at 
that time. 
The Fifth Amendment does not apply to statements that are made pursuant to a 
statutory grant of immunity. See, e.g,, Kastigar v. US., 406 U.S. 441, 447 n.13 (1972). 
The function of a grant of immunity, as it relates to the privilege against self- 
incrimination, has been aptly stated by the Court of Appeals in State v. Jones: 
When prosecution and conviction are precluded by grant of immunity, the 
privilege against self-incrimination does not apply. Immunity operates to 
"compel testimony over a claim of privilege" against self-incrimination. 
Both the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and immunity 
statutes protect a witness from future prosecutions. 
State v. Jones, 129 ldaho 471, 476, 926 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Ct. App. 1996) (internal 
citations omitted). 
A legislative act or a court order that precludes the use of statements against the 
defendant when made by the defendant under the grant of immunity constitutes "use 
immunity." See State v. Pratf, 125 ldaho 546, 560-561, 873 P.2d 800, 814-815 (1993). 
While a grant of immunity does not confer additional constitutional rights on the person 
making the statement, use immunity prohibits authorities from using the compelled 
testimony in any respect, and it therefore ensures that the testimony cannot lead to the 
infliction of criminal penalties as a result of the immunized statements or testimony. Id. 
at 561, 873 P.2d at 815 (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453). Use immunity also applies 
"at the sentencing stage of a criminal proceeding." Id. 
The statute at issue with regard to the limitations on the use of competency 
evaluations falls within the ambit of a use immunity statute. ldaho Code § 18-21'5 
provides that: 
A statement made by a person subject to psychiatric or psychological 
examination pursuant to sections 18-21 1, 18-212 or 19-2522, ldaho Code, 
for purposes of such examination or treatment shall not be admissible into 
evidence in any criminal proceeding against him on any issue other than 
the defendant's ability to assist counsel at trial or to form any specific 
intent which is an element of the crime charged, except that such 
statements of a defendant to a psychiatrist or psychologist as are relevant 
for purposes of impeachment purposes may be received subject to the 
usual rules of evidence governing matters of impeachment. 
I.C. 3 18-215. 
This statute precludes the use of statements made by the defendant as evidence 
against him or her in any criminal proceeding on issues unrelated to competency or the 
ability to form the specific intent to commit an offense. As such, this statute constitutes 
a statutory grant of use immunity in favor of defendants undergoing competency 
evaluations. See Pratt, 125 ldaho at 560-561, 873 P.2d at 814-815. Because the 
defendant enjoys statutory immunity for his statements made in the course of the 
competency evaluation, Mr. Jockumsen could not have invoked his right to remain silent 
because he was already granted the absolute assurance through this statute that his 
statements would not be later used against him in a criminal proceeding. 
The two cases primarily relied on by the State in support of its claims are 
inapposite to the issues at bar because neither of these cases deal with statements 
made pursuant to a statutory grant of immunity. The State relies largely on two cases: 
State V. Curless, 137 ldaho 138,44 P.3d 11 93 (Ct. App. 2002) and Madison v. Craven, 
144 ldaho 696, 169 P.3d 284 (Ct. App. 2007). (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-12.) However, 
both of these cases arise out of contexts where the defendant's statements were made 
with no grant of statutory use immunity, and therefore the defendant could have invoked 
his or her Fifth Amendment rights at the time of making the statements. 
In Curless, the statements at issue were made during the course of a 
psychosexual evaluation ordered for purposes of sentencing. Curless, 137 ldaho at 
140-143, 44 P.3d at 1195-1 198. The governing statute for such evaluations, I.C. § 18- 
8316, expressly provides that, "If ordered by the court, an offender convicted of any 
offense listed in section 18-8304, ldaho Code, shall submit to an evaluation to be 
completed and submitted to the district court ... for the court's consideration prior to 
7 
sentencing and incarceration or release on probation." I.C. § 18-8316 (emphasis 
added). Under this language, it is very clear that any statements made during the 
course of the evaluation may be used against the defendant at sentencing, and 
therefore there is no concomitant immunity for the defendant's statements in such a 
hearing. As such, the holding in Curless does not apply. 
In the same vein, the portion of the Madison Opinion relied upon by the State 
involved statements made by the defendant to the presentence investigator for 
purposes of completing the presentence investigation report. Madison, 144 ldaho at 
700, 169 P.3d at 288. The fundamental purpose of such reports is to enable the district 
court to determine an appropriate sentence. See, e.g., State v. Romero, 116 ldaho 391, 
393-394, 775 P.2d 1233, 1235-1236 (1989). Because of this, there is no statutory 
immunity against the use of these statements against the defendant at sentencing, and 
the Fifth Amendment applies. 
Mr. Jockumsen could not have asserted his Fifth Amendment rights during the 
course of the competency evaluation because the legislature had granted him statutory 
immunity against the use of these statements against him in any criminal proceeding on 
any issue other than whether he was competent to stand trial. I.C. 3 18-215. As such, 
the State's argument that he should have asserted his Fifth Amendment right during his 
competency evaluation is without merit. 
C. Mr. Jockumsen's Assertion That The District Court's Use Of His Competency 
Evaluations At Sentencing Constituted An Abuse Of Discretion Bv Failina To 
Abide By Legal Standards Attendant To Its Discretion At Sentencinq Is Properly 
Justiciable As An Abuse Of The Court's Discretion At Sentencinq Under State V. 
It is well-established that the standard that this Court applies to a review of a 
sentence on appeal is abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 146 ldaho 378, 
384, 195 P.3d 737, 743 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jafek, 141 ldaho 71, 74-75, 106 P.3d 
397, 400-401 (Ct. App. 2005). The three-part test for an abuse of discretion is equally 
well-established - this Court will review the district court's sentencing determination for 
(1) whether the district court correctly recognized the issue as one of discretion, (2) 
whether the court acted within the proper boundaries of that discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards that are applicable to the district court's discretionary 
determination; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision through the 
exercise of reason. Id. It is the second prong of the inquiry that is at stake in this 
appeal - whether the district court acted in violation of applicable legal standards 
attendant to its discretion at sentencing when the court considered evidence from 
Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluation in several aspects of its sentencing decision. 
The controlling case on this issue, Stafe v. Cope, makes clear that this type of 
error falls within the category of an abuse of discretion based upon the failure to follow 
legal standards that are applicable to the court's sentencing determinations. As stated 
by the Court in Cope: 
Ultimately the determination of whether a particular sentence is an abuse 
of discretion depends upon the information that is used in framing the 
sentence. If a defendant who retains the right to challenge a sentence is 
precluded from challenging the use of information that is statutorily 
excluded or false or otherwise improper, the right to appeal would be 
rendered meaningless 
Retention of the right to appeal a sentence is not so limited. It extends to 
the underlying information that forms the basis of the sentence. 
State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,499, 129 P.3d 1241, 1248 (2006). 
Because I.C. § 18-215 extended a statutory grant of immunity to defendants for 
all statements made in the course of competency evaluations, and this provision of 
statutory immunity extends to sentencing proceedings, this statute placed a clear 
prohibition on the power of the district court to inject these materials into evidence at 
sentencing. In addition, sentencing determinations are consistently reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion, including whether the district court followed applicable law. As 
such, the issue of whether the district court acted in contravention of the applicable 
provisions of I.C. 3 18-215 at sentencing is properly before this Court. 
The District Court's Use Of Mr. Jockumsen's Competency Evaluation At Sentencinq, 
And inclusion Of This Report in The Presentence investiqation Report. Was Improper 
Under I.C. 6 18-215 
As previously noted, the legislature has expressly provided, by statute, for a 
defendant to have use immunity regarding the substance of any of his or her remarks 
made in the course of a competency evaluation in order to further the accuracy and 
efficacy of competency determinations. See I.C. § 18-215. The State has suggested 
that this Court should construe the language of this statute to only extend to statements 
made "for purposes of examination and treatment." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) 
However, the State's argument omits a key term from the language of I.C. 9 18-215 that 
creates an entirely different meaning with regard to the scope of coverage of this 
statute. 
ldaho Code 5 18-215 does not apply only to statements made "for purposes of 
evaluation and treatment," but instead applies to a "statement made by a person 
subjected to a psychiatric or psychological examination or treatment pursuant to 
sections 18-21 1, 18-21 2, or 19-2522, ldaho Code, for purposes of such examination or 
treatment." I.C. § 18-215. The term "such" is an adjective that, in this context, means 
"of the character, quality, or extent previously indicated or implied." Merriam-Webster 
Online Dicfionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/such (site last visited on 
9/29/09). "Such examination" would therefore refer back to the prior phrase "psychiatric 
or psychological examination." In light of this, the plain language of the statute applies 
to any statements that were made during the course of the competency evaluation itself. 
The State has further suggested that the district court's use of Mr. Jockumsen's 
statements in his competency evaluations, and the opinions of the competency 
evaluators based thereupon, were proper as impeachment on the part of the district 
court. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) However, this argument is contrary to the ldaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Cope. In Cope, as here, the district court injected evidence 
of the defendant's statements, and the evaluations based upon those statements, both 
at sentencing itself and in the presentence investigation report. Cope, 142 ldaho at 
495, 129 P.3d at 1244. The Court in Cope held that: 
Cope's statements to the psychiatrist for purposes of the competency 
evaluation should not have been used. They did not fall under the limited 
exception allowing use for impeachment. 
Id. at 499. 129 P.3d at 1248. 
This holding is consistent with the language of I.C. 3 18-215 itself. The limited 
exception for impeachment provided by this statute expressly states that the 
admissibility of this evidence is, "subject to the usual rules of evidence governing 
matters of impeachment." I.C. 3 18-215. It is well established that the rules of evidence 
are applicable to trial proceedings, but they do not apply to sentencing. See, e.g., 
Stafe v. Hoover, 138 ldaho 414, 422, 64 P.3d 340, 348 (Ct. App. 2003); I.R.E. 101(b), 
(e)(3). Reading this provision in context, it is clear that the narrow impeachment 
exception provided is limited to the circumstance of impeachment of the defendant at 
trial. 
Finally, as noted in the Appellant's Brief, this error was not harmless. While the 
State attempts to cast the harmlessness test as whether the district court considered 
other factors that were proper at sentencing, the actual test as articulated by the ldaho 
Supreme Court in Cope is whether the improper admission and consideration of 
competency evaluations "infected the sentence." Cope, 142 ldaho at 500, 129 P.3d at 
1249. 
The sentence in Cope was deemed harmless largely because there was ample 
information presented to the district court from sources unrelated to the competency 
evaluation that informed the district court regarding the mental health issues suffered by 
the defendant. Cope, 142 ldaho at 500-502, 129 P.3d at 1249-1251. This included 
materials regarding prior involuntary psychiatric commitments that were provided by the 
defense and the testimony provided by the defense's own mental health expert at 
sentencing. Id. In this case, unlike Cope, there was no other source of information 
regarding Mr. Jockumsen's mental illnesses and conditions that was not fatally infected 
with information taken directly from the competency evaluations. (See Appellant's Brief, 
pp.11-12.) As such, it cannot be said that the sentence receive by Mr. Jockurnsen, 
which was in part predicated on this improper information, was harmless. 
The Proper Standard For Review Of Whether The District Court Was Required To Sua 
Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation For Purposes Of Sentencinq Incorporates 
The Requirements Of Both I.C.R. 32(D) And I.C. 5 19-2522 
To the extent that the State appears to argue that consideration of the mandatory 
requirements of I.C. 19-2522 is not a part of the analysis for manifest disregard in the 
context of the failure of a court to sua sponfe order a mental health evaluation, and that 
only compliance with I.C.R. 32, without any reference to I.C. 19-2522, is the standard of 
review, this argument has already been considered and rejected by the Court of 
Appeals in the recent decision of State v. Durham, 146 ldaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723, 
726 (Ct. App. 2008). And, there was good reason for the Durham court's rejection of 
this assertion. 
Generally, when a statute and a court rule deal with the same subject matter and 
share a common purpose, this Court reads the two provisions in conjunction with one 
another. The case law regarding the sua sponte duty of the district court reflects this 
principle through analyzing the provisions of I.C.R. 32(d) in conjunction with I.C. 5 19- 
2522. Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845. See also Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 
162 P.3d at 788; Sfafe v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 881, 876 P.2d 158, 163 (Ct. App. 
1994); State v. Pearson, 108 ldaho 889, 890-892, 702 P.2d 927, 928-930 (Ct. App. 
1985). This Court similarly reads statutes and ldaho court rules in conjunction with one 
another in other contexts involving criminal trials or sentencing where the statute and 
the court rule deal with the same subject matter. See, e.g., Murillo v. Sfafe, 144 ldaho 
449, 452, n.l, 163 P.3d 238, 241 (Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing co-extensive right to an 
interpreter in both statute and court rule); State v. Dorsey, 139 ldaho 149, 150-51, 75 
P.3d 203, 204-205 (Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing legal sufficiency of an information as 
being governed by both statute and court rule); State v. Pole, 139 ldaho 370, 372, 79 
P.3d 729, 731 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing to both statute and court rule for standards of 
probable cause hearing). Other jurisdictions also explicitly hold that statutes and court 
rules that deal with a common subject matter or that have a common purpose are to be 
read together to give effect to both. See, e.g., People v. Priest, 803 NE.2d 181, 185 
(III.Ct. App. 2003); Cooper v. Sacco, 745 A.2d 1074, 1077 (Md. 2000). This is also in 
accord with Idaho's well-established rule of statutory construction that statutes relating 
to the same subject matter are to be construed together. See, e.g., Stafe v. Callaghan, 
143 ldaho 856,858,153 P.3d 1202,1204 (Ct. App. 2006). 
I.C.R. 32(d) provides in relevant part that the decision as to whether to order a 
psychological evaluation is to be made by the sentencing judge. While it is within the 
discretion of the district court to order a psychological evaluation for purposes of 
sentencing, the legislature has placed constraints on the proper exercise of that 
discretion through enacting I.C. 9 19-2522. Criminal Rule 32(d) and I.C. § 19-2522 deal 
with the same subject matter: the district court's duty to order a mental health 
evaluation for purposes of setting an appropriate sentence. The court rule and the 
statute also share a common purpose: to ensure that the district court has the 
necessary information before it regarding potential mental conditions of the defendant 
that are relevant in fashioning the appropriate sentence. As such, these two provisions 
should be read in conjunction with one another. 
Here, the specific provisions of I.C. (j 19-2522 clarify that the district court is 
under an independent duty to order a psychological evaluation where it is likely that the 
defendant's mental condition will be a substantial factor at sentencing and for good 
cause shown. Courts interpreting the duty of the district court to order a mental health 
evaluation sua sponte focus directly on the mandatory language included in I.C. (j 19- 
2522. See Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845. It is the plain language of 
I.C. (j 19-2522 stating that the district court "shall appoint" a psychiatrist or psychologist 
to obtain a mental health evaluation, read in conjunction with the provisions of I.C.R. 
32(d), that creates an independent duty on the part of the court to order a mental health 
evaluation under certain circumstances. State v. Coonts, 137 ldaho 150, 152-153, 44 
P.3d 1205, 1207-1208 (Ct. App. 2002). In fact, the court in Coonts appears to root the 
sua sponte duty of the district court to order a mental health evaluation entirely in the 
mandatory language of I.C. (j 19-2522, finding that "frustrations with defense counsel's 
lack of diligence do not, however, excuse the trial court from compliance with I.C. (j 19- 
2522." Id. at 153.44 P.3d at 1208. 
As stated by the court in Craner, "The legal standards governing the court's 
decision whether to order a psychological evaluation and report are contained in 
I.C. (j 19-2522." Craner, 137 ldaho at 189, 45 P.3d at 845; see also Collins, 144 ldaho 
at 409, 162 P.3d at 788. Moreover, if there was sufficient evidence before the district 
court to determine that the defendant's mental condition would be a factor at 
sentencing, and the information before the district court does not satisfy the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, this constitutes a manifest disregard of the provisions of 
I.C.R. 32(d). Craner, 137 ldaho at 190-191, 45 P.3d at 846-847. This is in accord with 
other decisions interpreting the provisions of I.C. 3 19-2522(3) as providing the specific 
content to which a psychological report must conform to be within the proper exercise of 
the court's discretion under I.C.R. 32(d). See, e.g., Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d 
at 788; McFarland, 125 ldaho at 881, 876 P.2d at 163; Pearson, 108 ldaho at 890-892, 
702 P.2d at 928-930. Applying the relevant case law, the question of compliance with 
the provisions of I.C. § 19-2522 is inextricably intertwined with the analysis regarding 
whether the district court acted in manifest disregard of the provisions of I.C.R. 32(d). 
The relevant legal standards considered by this Court when examining whether 
the district court abused its discretion in failing to sua sponfe order a psychological 
evaluation are those contained in I.C.R. 32(d) and I.C. Cj 19-2522. The relevant case 
law articulating these standards has consistently read these provisions together based 
on the fact that they are in pari maferia. The determination of whether the district court 
acted in manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32(d) is made in reference to whether there is good 
cause to believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a substantial factor at 
sentencing and whether the information before it meets the requirements of I.C. § 19- 
2522(3). Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d at 788. As such, in reviewing whether the 
district court in this case abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a 
mental health evaluation, this Court should read I.C.R. 32(d), I.C. 3 19-2522, and the 
case law interpreting the interplay of these provisions together in making the 
determination of whether the district court abused its discretion. 
The State in this case makes no argument that the materials that were properly 
before the district court met with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. As argued in the 
Appellant's Brief, there was every reason to believe that Mr. Jockumsen's mental health 
would be a significant factor at sentencing; and it was, in fact, a central focus of the 
district court. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-24.) However, the materials properly before the 
district court failed to address nearly all of the critical factors that were statutorily 
required pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522(3). (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-24.) As such, the 
district court's failure to sua sponfe order a mental health evaluation constituted 
manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 and I.C. § 19-2522. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jockumsen respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and 
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing after a complete evaluation of his mental 
health conditions is made in accordance with I.C. § 19-2522 and I.C.R. 32. Further, he 
requests that this Court remand his case to the district court with instructions to order a 
new PSI that omits the contents and conclusions of his competency evaluations and 
also instruct the district court to forward the new PSI to the Department of Correction. 
In the alternative, he asks that this Court reverse the district court's order relinquishing 
jurisdiction and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 7" day of October, 2009. 
. 
SARAH E. T O % P K ~  
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of October, 2009, 1 sewed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
MICHAEL L JOCKUMSEN 
INMATE # 85070 
lMSl 
PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
RONALD BUSH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED COPY OF BRIEF 
BANNOCK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
PO BOX 4147 
POCATELLO ID 83205 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 

